CPR Part 85 – new guidance provided

High Court Enforcement Group asked Master Victoria McCloud to review two claims that had been brought under CPR Part 85 (Civil Procedure Rule).

Master McCloud has reviewed the two claims – Riaz and Celador Radio – and produced a written judgment on 16th February 2018, addressing the issues raised within the CPR and providing clear direction for High Court Enforcement Officers (HCEOs) going forward.

Before formally handing down this judgment, she invited observations from HCEOs across the industry which might assist the court given the specialist nature of this decision and of their expertise, many of which were incorporated into the judgment.

The background to CPR Part 85 and interpleader

With the introduction of the Taking Control of Goods Regulations 2013 and the enactment of Part 3 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, the old interpleader rule covered by RSC Order 17 was replaced by CPR Part 85.

CPR Part 85 covers claims by third parties who say they are entitled to goods that have been taken into control by an HCEO while enforcing a High Court writ of control.

The process for a claim

The process set out in CPR Part 85 is that:

  • The third party gives the notice required under r. 85.4(1)
  • If the claim is disputed, the creditor or any other party with a claim to the goods gives the counter-notice under r. 85.4(3)
  • If the creditor or other claimant to the goods fails to give the notice required by 85.4(3), the HCEO may apply to the court for direction as to what to do and for protection against liability
  • Where a notice is given under 85.4(3), the party claiming the goods must issue an application to the court for determination, under r. 85.5

The rule’s shortcomings

All straightforward, but the problems arise where the third party has given notice, the creditor has given the counter-notice, but the third party does not then start the application under r. 85.5. this is because the CPR does not cover what the HCEO holding the goods should do next.

The other issue is that there is no time limit by which the application must be made by the creditor, so there is no clear point at which the rule has been breached, and no provision within the rule for what should happen when no application is made.

Master McCloud’s judgment

You can read the full judgment below.

Celador Radio and Riaz judgment

In summary her order is that:

  1. Unless by 4pm on a date 14 days from the date of service of this order the Third Party files and serves evidence setting out its basis for its asserted rival claim to title, it shall be debarred from relying on evidence of title to contradict that put forth by the HCEO.
  2. In the event that the Third Party is so debarred then without further hearing the HCEO shall be entitled to a declaration that the judgment debtor was at the material time the person with title to the seized goods and consequent upon that declaration the HCEO shall be entitled to dispose of them in execution and shall be entitled to his reasonable costs summarily assessed in the sum of [£959.30 in Riaz, £681.50 in Celador] being the sum claimed for this application.
  3. In the event that the Third Party serves and files evidence as above and is not debarred, the HCEO shall apply to this court for directions as to determination of the issue of title and as to management of the dispute and payment of the sums required by para 60(4)(a) of the Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 Sch. 12, and for the application to proceed thereafter in accordance with CPR Part 85, and in that event costs shall be reserved.
  4. In the event that the Third Party serves and files evidence as above and is not debarred, any further evidence relied on by the judgment creditor in respect of the ownership of the [goods, in Riaz money in Celador] shall be provided by the Creditor, and the HCEO’s witness evidence shall deal with enforcement steps taken insofar as not already detailed in the original application for this order.

Master McCloud also suggests that the court make a decision about the sum to be paid into court at the same time as it makes the above order to remove the time and expense of having a further hearing.

She also suggests that, going forward, HCEOs make an application to the court supported by evidence of the basis for seizure, and evidence from the creditor as to why they believe the goods are the judgment debtor’s, and seek an unless order in the form broadly as above leading to a declaration in the event of default, which then should offer the degree of protection reasonably required by the HCEO as ‘middleman’.

Conclusion

The directors of High Court Enforcement Group would like to thank Master McCloud for both making and for publishing her judgment, which will greatly assist HCEOs and creditors.

Back